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THE IRRELEVANCE OF SAN FRANCISCO
ARTS & ATHLETICS, INC. V. UNITED
STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE TO
THE FLAG CONTROVERSY
William E. Lee*
Government protection of the ftag of the United States is the
most politically charged contemporary freedom of expression issue.
President Bush believes that the Constitution should be amended to
authorize punishment of ftag burning.' After Texas v. Johnson 2
held ftag burning to be constitutionally protected, Congress tried to
correct Johnson by statuteJ but the Supreme Court in United States
v. Eichman4 found the new statute unconstitutional when applied to
ftag burning as a form of political protest. After Eichman, both the
House and the Senate rejected the proposed constitutional amendments Republican party strategists used the amendment issue to
put Democrats on the defensive in the 1990 elections. 6
• Professor, Henry W. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, Uni·
versity of Georgia.
I. President Bush announced that he was "viscerally" angered by flag desecration.
Wall St. J., June 28, 1989, at Al6, col. I. For an explanation of the Bush Administration's
views on the necessity of a constitutional amendment to protect the flag's symbolism, see

Measures to Protect the Physical Integrity of the American Flag: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, JOist CONG., 1st Sess. 118-19 (1989) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]
(letter from Attorney General Thornburgh). See also id. at 69-89 (statement of Assistant
Attorney General Barr). See generally, Statutory and Constitutional Responses to the
Supreme Coun Decision in Texas v. Johnson: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, JOist CONG., 1st Sess. (1989).
2. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
3. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. JOI-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989). President
Bush allowed the measure to become law without his signature because he favors a constitutional amendment. Statement on the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1619 (Oct. 26, 1989).
4. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
5. For discussions of the amendment, see 136 CONG. REc. H3,996-4,029, H4,035-88
(daily ed. June 21, 1990); S8,694-8,739 (daily ed. June 26, 1990). The Senate also rejected the
amendment in 1989. 135 CoNG. REc. S13,733 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1989). See generally S.
REP. No. 162, JOist CONG., 1st Sess. (1989).
6. Wall St. J., June 12, 1990, at A22, col. I (stating that Republicans hope that the flag
controversy will revive the party's effort to paint the Democrats as out of step with mainstream views); N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, at AI, col. 3 (the vote on the flag amendment may
be only a prelude to an intense battle in the 1990 Congressional campaigns). President Bush
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Johnson and Eichman answer a limited range of questions
about the government's power to protect the flag. The cases leave
unanswered many questions raised by other types of government
efforts to protect the flag, such as protecting its physical integrity in
all circumstances. 1 Are the questions raised by the types of laws
not addressed in Johnson and Eichman answered by other Supreme
Court cases? In his dissenting opinion in Johnson, Chief Justice
Rehnquist cited San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Committees (SFAA), where the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on the use of Olympic symbols, as precedent for government actions protecting the flag.9 In testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Professor Tribe also drew upon SFAA, stating, "Now, you can't tell me there is more power in Congress to
protect the Olympic flag than the American flag. That's nonsense."to Both the Chief Justice and Professor Tribe have seriously
misread SFAA. This Article demonstrates that SFAA is not relevant
to current governmental efforts to protect the flag.

I.

SFAA

The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 regulates relations among
amateur sports organizations, establishes rights for amateur athletes
and grants the United States Olympic Committee the power to control who uses Olympic emblems-such as the five interlocking
rings-and words-such as "Olympic"-for certain promotional
purposes.tt The USOC raises the bulk of the money to support
American participation in the Olympics by granting licenses for the
use of the emblems and words.l2 In SFAA, the USOC argued that
the petitioner, sponsor of the "Gay Olympics," misappropriated its
also announced that he would talk about the flag issue during the 1990 elections. 26
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 939 (June 12, 1990).
7. Whether Congressional action to protect the flag is constitutional depends in large
measure upon both the legislation's terms and its justifications. As Dean Stone pointed out,
many of the questions raised by this issue take us "into essentially unexplored territory."
Senate Hearings at 200, supra note 1 (statement of Geoffrey S~one). For an elaboration of his
views, see Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 15 IOWA L. REv. Ill (1989).
8. 483 u.s. 522 (1987).
9. 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In contrast, Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court in Johnson brushed SFAA aside, stating the case does not even begin to
"tell us whether the Government may criminally punish physical conduct toward the flag
engaged in as a means of political protest." /d. at 2545 n.IO. See infra text accompanying
note 65.
10. Senate Hearings at 146, supra note 1 (testimony of Professor Laurence Tribe).
11. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-96 (Supp. V 1981).
12. /d. at 380. The USOC's financial statement for 1987 shows revenue of $35.5 million. Corporate royalty payments amounted to $16.8 million. The USOC also received $2.7
million to authorize television advertisers to display the USOC's marks during American
telecasts of the 1988 Olympic games. The corporate royalty payments and television royalties
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commercially valuable property. The USOC claimed that uncontrolled commercial use of "Olympic" would diminish the value of
its marks and reduce its ability to raise funds.'3 The Supreme Court
agreed, holding that the Amateur Sports Act authorized a permanent injunction prohibiting use of the phrase "Gay Olympics."'4
Further, the Court held that the Act did not violate the first amendment.IS The Court's treatment of the questions of overbreadth and
the fit between means and ends reveal the irrelevance of SFAA to
the current flag controversy.
A.

OVERBREADTH

The Amateur Sports Act's scope extends beyond trademark
law: the USOC is not required to show that any unauthorized uses
of its emblems and terms are likely to cause confusion, and while
the Act grants the USOC remedies under trademark law, the unauthorized user does not have the traditional defenses to a trademark
infringement action.'6 In its analysis of the statute, moreover, the
Court blended trademark, dilution, and misappropriation concepts.
First, the Court held that "Olympic" is not a generic term. That is,
Congress could reasonably conclude that the commercial value of
"Olympic" was created by the USOC. Because of this, Justice Powell found that the Congressional decision to grant the USOC a limited property right in "Olympic" was within the scope of
Congressional power to protect trademarks.11 Second, the law's application to nontrademark infringing uses was justified in antidilution terms.1s Justice Powell stated that even nonconfusing,
noncommercial uses of "Olympic" could reasonably be regarded as
lessening the distinctiveness and "thus the commercial value of the
represented 55% of the USOC's 1987 revenue. DELOITIE, HASKINS & SELLS, UNITED
STATES OLYMPIC COMMITIEE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 3 (Apr. 8, 1988).
13. Brief for Respondents at 25-27, supra note 8. The Amateur Sports Act does not
require that the USOC prove that unauthorized uses of "Olympic" cause harm; a court may
presume harm to the USOC. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 982, 986 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986),
aff'd, 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
14. 483 u.s. 532-35.
15. /d. at 535-41.
16. /d. at 531.
17. /d. at 534-35. The rationale for exercising this power was stated in traditional
trademark terms: the law insures that the USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts so that
it "will have an incentive to continue to produce a 'quality product,' that, in tum, benefits the
public." /d. at 537. For commentary on the Court's analysis of whether or not "Olympic"
was a generic term, see Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympic Case, 69 B.U.L
REV. 131 (1989).
18. Dilution statutes are based on the belief that nontrademark infringing uses nonetheless diminish the value of trademarks. The rationale for such laws was stated in Schecter,
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L REv. 813 (1927).
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marks." 19 Finally, because unauthorized uses of "Olympic" in the
context of athletic events invoke the image "carefully cultivated" by
the USOC, such uses misappropriate the USOC's property.2o
To Justice Powell, the Amateur Sports Act's reach beyond
trademark law did not make the act unconstitutionally overbroad.2I
The traditional chilling effect notion that underlies the overbreadth
doctrine is best understood as resting on a judicial presumption in
favor of free expression:22 The harm from a potential chill of constitutionally protected speech exceeds the harm caused when unprotected speech goes unpunished.23 Since the Court believes that
commercial speech is "hardy," the chilling effect justification for
overbreadth analysis applies "weakly, if at all" in the commercial
speech context.24 Another reason the overbreadth presumption
does not apply to the commercial speech is because the Court perceives commercial speech as less important than fully protected
types of expression.2s Commercial speech is analogous to nonobscene sexually-oriented expression: partially protected, but not
worthy of the extraordinary protection offered by the overbreadth
doctrine.26 In rejecting the petitioner's overbreadth claim, Justice
Powell noted that the Act applies primarily to commercial speech.27
The Court regards only statutes that are substantially overbroad as facially invalid; that is, the breadth of an invalid statute
must extend far beyond its legitimate sweep.2s Since the SFAA majority found the Act legitimately applied to commercial expression,
19. 483 U.S. at 539.
20. /d. at 541. In the trademark context, the rationale is that since the owner created
the mark's value, others should not be able to benefit from its use. Denicola, Trademarks as
Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade
Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 158, 166-81. Justice Powell, however, cited a nontrademark
case, International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (misappropriation
of news stories from a rival news service) for the misappropriation aspect of the case. 483
U.S. at 541.
21. 483 U.S. at 536 n.l5.
22. Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect,'' 58
B.U.L. REV. 685, 732 (1978). See also Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031, 1041 (1983) (overbreadth
doctrine rests upon the special position of first amendment rights); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 852 (1970) (the preferred status of expression is the ultimate rationale of the overbreadth doctrine).
23. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977).
24. /d. In other settings the Court has also noted the limited applicability of the overbreadth doctrine. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974) (military context);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (speech intertwined with conduct).
25. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5
(1980).
26. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976).
27. 483 U.S. at 539 & 536 n.l5.
28. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. Where a statute reaches a small range of protected
activities, the Court believes the deterrence of protected expression will be minimal. New
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the overbreadth question was whether the law substantially affected
noncommercial expression. The Court found that the law had only
a limited impact on noncommercial expression. That finding was
bolstered by the following factors: 1) the perception that the
SFAA's noncommercial, promotional uses of "Olympic" were part
of the Act's legitimate core, and 2) an unwillingness to consider
hypothetical applications of the Act and instead a determination to
rely solely on its application to the litigant.
With respect to the first factor, the Court deferred to the judgment of Congress on the harm caused by noncommercial, promotional uses of "Olympic." Congress reasonably could conclude,
Justice Powell wrote, that such uses implicate the value created by
the USOC.29 In particular, the SFAA was exploiting the imagery
created by the USOC.Jo Regarding the second factor, the Court
disregards a law's impact on the litigant and considers the impact
on third parties only where there is substantial overbreadth.JI In
SFAA the Court was uninterested in hypothetical applications of the
Act because its application to noncommercial speech was limited.
Most importantly, "purely expressive" uses of "Olympic" were not
affected by the Act.J2 As an example of a "purely expressive" use,
Justice Powell cited a case in which the Act was not violated by a
group that used the USOC's symbols to oppose conversion of an
Olympic facility into a jail.JJ While the SFAA claimed that its use
of "Olympic" was intended to make a statement about the status of
homosexuals in society,34 the Court was unwilling to treat the
SFAA's activities as charitable or ideological solicitationJs or as
"purely expressive," because the athletic contest was modeled after
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982). Professor Redish, however, questions this aspect of
the overbreadth doctrine, Redish, supra note 22, at 1065.
29. 483 U.S. at 540-41 & n.20.
30. /d. at n.l9.
31. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947,959 (1984) (stating that
unless a litigant can show that a statute is substantially overbroad, it has no "standing" to
allege that, as applied to others, the statute might be unconstitutional).
32. 483 U.S. at 536 & n.l4. At oral argument, counsel for the USOC emphasized that
the statute did not reach discussions of public controversy such as "We protest the Olympic
Games." Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, supra note 8. None of the Justices probed this
point.
33. Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
34. The SFAA used the term "Olympic" to describe its athletic competition because it
conveyed the format of the event and described the SF AA 's goals of "peace, friendship and
positive social interaction." Brief for Petitioners at 6, supra note 8.
35. The Court regards ideological or charitable solicitation as noncommercial speech
and closely scrutinizes regulation of such solicitation. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the
Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988). The SFAA Court was unwilling to treat the SFAA's activities as
protected because of the "exploitation" of the USOC's marks. The Court rejected SFAA's
argument that its nonprofit status affected the case: "But when the question is the scope of a
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the Olympics.36 Had the SFAA merely burned the Olympic flag to
protest discrimination against homosexuals, the Court likely would
have treated the action as protected speech; the sponsorship of an
athletic event, however, even when intended to make a political
statement, was not regarded as "purely expressive."
Justice Brennan's dissent found the Act overbroad because it
prohibited noncommercial uses of "Olympic" to promote athletic
and theatrical events, even when those events are aimed at educating the public about social and political ideas.37 The range of noncommercial promotional speech affected by the Act included
"critical reviews of theatrical performances, anticipatory notices
and descriptions in the media of athletic competitions, and distribution of educational literature describing the sociopolitical reasons
for holding the public events."Js In Justice Brennan's view, nonconfusing and good faith descriptive uses-which do not violate
trademark rights-were impermissibly prohibited by the Act.39
The dispute between Justice Powell and Justice Brennan in
SFAA hinges on the communicative importance of "Olympic" and
the harm caused by noncommercial, promotional uses. Justice
Brennan regarded "Olympic" as a unique term with a deep history
in our language and culture. 40 Further, he found no evidence in the
record to suggest that trademark law was insufficient to protect the
USOC from economic harm.4t Justice Powell, though, thought
that there were other ways for the SFAA to express its views about
the status of homosexuals in society; the SFAA was merely exploiting the "commercial magnetism" of "Olympic," a word which
would decline in value through uncontrolled use.42
B.

REASONABLENESS

Justice Brennan's dissent raises an interesting question: given
the existence of less restrictive laws, such as the federal trademark
law and state dilution statutes, was the Amateur Sports Act broader
than necessary? The majority was uninterested in whether less restrictive laws would sufficiently protect the USOC. Instead, it was
satisfied that Congress considered the Act to be necessary. That
legitimate property right in a work, the SFAA's distinction [between nonprofit and for profit
groups] is inapposite." 483 U.S. at 541 n.19.
36. 483 U.S. at 540 & n.18.
37. /d. at 567-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. /d. at 566 n.28.
39. /d. at 563-66.
40. /d. at 569.
41. /d. at 572.
42. 483 U.S. at 536, 539-40.
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analysis was largely dictated by the Court's determination that the
Act would be scrutinized under the commercial speech and O'Brien
tests.
Commercial speech regulations must be no greater than necessary.43 This prong of the commercial speech test requires that the
fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends be reasonable, a standard that "requires something
short of a least-restrictive-means standard."44 Similarly, the
O'Brien test for content-neutral restrictions4s has a no-greater-thannecessary prong that is easily satisfied. 46 A central aspect of both
the commercial speech and O'Brien tests is the Court's deference to
the judgment of the legislature. For example, in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. 47 the Court held that a ban on casino
gambling advertising was valid even though less restrictive means of
discouraging gambling, such as government-sponsored antigambling messages, were not employed. The Court stated, "[w]e
think it is up the legislature to decide whether or not such a
'counterspeech' policy would be as effective in reducing the demand
for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising."4s In United
States v. Albertini 49 the Court upheld a protester's exclusion from a
military base open house even though less restrictive methods of
protecting the base's security existed. The Court held that under
O'Brien, the validity of regulations "does not turn on a judge's
agreement with the responsible decision maker concerning the most
appropriate method for promoting significant government
interests. "so
In SFAA the Court applied the commercial speech test to those
aspects of the Act affecting commercial speech and the O'Brien test
to those aspects affecting noncommercial speech. Since the two
tests are substantially similar,s1 the Court merely required that the
law do no more than promote the governmental interest. Thus, it
was hardly surprising that the Court uncritically stated that Congress could reasonably have determined that the commercial and
noncommercial aspects of the Act were no broader than
43.
(1980).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Cornrn'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033 (1989).
391 u.s. 367, 377 (1968).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2758 (1989).
478 u.s. 328 (1986).
/d. at 344.
472 u.s. 675 (1985).
/d. at 689.
483 U.S. at 537 n.16.
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necessary.s2
The choice of the O'Brien test ensured that the noncommercial
aspects of the Act would not be subjected to a more stringent test
than the test applied to those aspects affecting commercial speech.s3
Why the Court selected O'Brien is significant. The Court regarded
the Act's restrictions as incidentals4 to the "primary congressional
purpose of encouraging and rewarding the USOC's activities."ss
That is, this was not a suppression of expression to protect onlookers from offense, or some similar message-related rationale, this was
a suppression that was justified in nonmessage-related terms. The
broader goal of the Act is to advance the Olympic movement and
the Act served this goal by supplying the USOC with the means to
raise money for American participation.s6 Moreover, the restrictions did not stand by themselves, but were part of a comprehensive
statute that regulated amateur sports. A ban on unauthorized uses
of "Olympic" has the same impact on speech whether the ban regulates only expression or whether it regulates expression along with
the rights of amateur athletes and relations among amateur sports
organizations. The difference between the two laws is that the comprehensive law is justified by a more significant interest than the law
that restricts only expression. Also, a comprehensive law is more
easily justified in content-neutral terms, and may not easily be
viewed as underinclusive.
Justice Brennan's dissent operated from a different perspective:
52. /d. at 539. That the Court was especially uninterested in considering whether the
Act's contours were broader than necessary is revealed by the following comment concerning
the ban on theatrical promotions:
Although a theatrical production is not as closely related to the primary use of
the word by the USOC as is an athletic event, Congress reasonably could have
found that when the word "Olympic" is used to promote such a production, it
would implicate the value given to the word by the USOC.
/d. at 541 n.20.
53. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), the Court dissected
a billboard ordinance and treated those aspects regulating commercial speech differently from
those aspects regulating noncommercial speech.
54. The Court uses the term in different ways. Sometimes the Court describes incidental restrictions as those that have an indirect or unintended effect on expression. See, e.g.,
Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 789 n.5 (1988). See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984) (camping regulation affecting
both expressive and nonexpressive acts described as having an mcidental impact on speech).
The Court also describes direct regulations of expression that have only a slight impact on
expressive opportunities as incidental. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984) (ordinance aimed only at signs). SFAA dealt with a direct restriction on expressive activity. The SFAA Court's reference to the restriction on "Olympic" as
incidental is most likely both a reference to the slight impact on communicative opportunity
and the fact that the restriction was an accompanying circumstance of legislation to foster
American participation in the Olympics.
55. 483 U.S. at 536 (note omitted).
56. /d. at 538-39.
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the Court rather than Congress should decide whether less restrictive measures are inadequate to protect the asserted interests.57 He
claimed that there was no evidence in the record that trademark
law was insufficient to protect the USOC from economic harm, nor
was there evidence that the SFAA's use of "Olympic" harmed the
reputation of the USOC.ss Further, the USOC failed to prove that
the California dilution statute was insufficient to protect the
USOC's marks from loss of distinctivenesss9 or that disclaimers
would be ineffective. 60
II.

CONCLUSION

SFAA is irrelevant to the current debate about the measures
necessary to protect the flag's symbolism. The Bush Administration and Congress are unconcerned with commercial exploitation of
the flag's symbolism. Yet SFAA is a commercial speech case bearing a striking resemblance to Posadas6t (decided only a year earlier); both cases rest on the premise that restrictions on certain types
of nondeceptive commercial speech are easily justified. Certainly a
central attribute of the Court's current free speech doctrine is that
commercial speech is subject to "modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression. "62
SFAA represents a special extension of trademark law. The
concept of commercially valuable property permeated the Court's
treatment of the law's limited impact on noncommercial expression.
Because of SFAA's emphasis on commercially valuable property,
the dilution aspect of SFAA is far removed from concerns that flag
destruction dilutes the symbolic value of the flag.63
SFAA speaks to the question of the government's authority to
offer limited protection to symbols created by others.64 The Court's
analysis of SFAA surely would have been different if purely political
speech had been affected by the statute. As long as the Court maintains a first amendment distinction between commercial speech and
57. /d. at 572-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. !d. at 572 & n.36.
59. /d. at 564 n.25.
60. /d. at 572.
61. 478 u.s. 328 (1986).
62. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
63. Similarly, the Court's treatment of misappropriation is phrased in terms of commercially valuable property. See, e.g., 483 U.S. at 541 (quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918)) (emphasizing the commercial value of news
reports).
64. For arguments that the first amendment limits the scope of trademark rights, see
Denicola, supra note 20; Kravitz, supra note 17; Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and
First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079 (1986).
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political speech, a flag protection law affecting political speech
presents issues entirely different from those addressed in SFAA.
The majority opinion in both Johnson and Eichman recognize this.
For example, the Court in Eichman stated, "We deal here with concededly political speech and have no occasion to pass on the validity
of laws regulating commercial exploitation of the image of the
United States flag. "6s
Central to SFAA is the content-neutral justification for therestriction: the government asserted a content-neutral interest beyond merely protecting "Olympic" as a symbol. Although
Congress rewrote the federal flag law in an attempt to eliminate
many of the content-based features that led to invalidation in the
Texas case, its justification for flag protection remained in contentbased terms.66 Even a flag law justified in content-neutral terms
raises questions about the government's ability to protect its own
symbols. Those questions are unanswered by SFAA. Acknowledging the limitations of SFAA is not to say that the Constitution must
be amended to protect the flag's symbolism. Rather, it is to recognize that the type of symbol and speech at issue in SFAA are unlike
the type of symbol and speech of concern to the Bush
Administration.

65. 110 S. Ct. at 2408 n.4. See aw id. at n.6 (distinguishing harm caused by commercial appropriation of the image of the flag from harm caused by flag burning). Counsel for
Eichman conceded at oral argument that Congress could prohibit use of the flag for commercial purposes. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, supra note 4.
66. 110 S. Ct. at 2408.

